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INTRODUCTION 
Revelations such as the ‘Snowden leaks’ (Bauman et al. 2014) and censorship 
methods used during the Arab Spring (Deibert and Crete-Nishihata 2012, 344) have brought 
attention to technologically supported censorship and surveillance. The public is now aware 
how digital tools and information are prone to tracing, interception, and suppression. 
Processes of eavesdropping and information collection (i.e., surveillance) are often 
interrelated with processes of removal, displacement, and restriction of material or speech 
(i.e., censorship). Both are entangled with dynamics of secrecy, leaving censorship and 
surveillance techniques open to abuses (Setty 2015).  
Digital censorship and surveillance may also constitute a threat to academic freedom. 
Technologically supported censorship and surveillance impinge upon scholars’ ability to 
conduct unobstructed inquiry. The increasing reliance on the Internet and other information 
and communication technologies (ICT) to communicate, collect data, or distribute findings 
has only exacerbated this threat. Digital tools and data allow for the easier confiscation or 
destruction of research (Cyranoski 2008, 871; Gellman 2015), the manipulation of 
information, or the control and prevention of access to it (Fishman 2010). Besides, digital 
surveillance puts users under general suspicion, creates a securitised climate, and leads to 
chilling effects. The field of security studies is certainly not immune to these effects. 
This contribution aims to systematically explore the methods which can be used for 
digital censorship and surveillance as well as techniques to resist them. The article is split 
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into three parts. The first section discusses why academia – and especially security studies 
scholars – should engage with debates on technological information control. The second 
section outlines how the digital tools used by academics can be subject to censorship, and 
how this affects the profession. The final section examines what to do against digital 
censorship and surveillance and explores whether cryptographic circumvention methods 
should be included within academic teaching and scholarship. As part of this discussion we 
hope to foster a debate about the legal and technical protection of researchers, and engender a 
critical reflection about digital security. 
THE WHY 
One of the most profound reasons why academics are exhorted to participate in 
debates on technological information control emerges within debates on human rights. The 
right to privacy and unfettered correspondence as well as the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression constitute fundamental pillars upon which opposition to censorship and 
surveillance rest. Recently, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
declaring the unequivocal application of human rights in the online sphere (A/HRC/32/L.20). 
Dating further back, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976) includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information through any media, 
regardless of frontiers. This Article is essential for the scholarly profession as it touches upon 
the fundamental idea of unrestricted academic inquiry. 
The principle of academic freedom also embodies rights to unimpaired access of 
information and unrestricted scholarship. Academic freedom allows for independent 
teaching, research, and scholarly expression, crucial to advancing expertise, critical thinking, 
and general human knowledge (Altbach 2001, 205). Its importance has been discussed at 
great length (Thought & Action, 2005; International Studies Review, 2007). Academic 
freedom gives researchers the security to voice concerns and publish research that does not 
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necessarily reflect official policies or public opinion. However, this “professorial freedom of 
teaching, research, and expression” (Altbach 2013, 138) is progressively suffering from the 
securitised post-9/11 climate with its over-emphasis on secrecy and “preemptive security 
practices” (Falk 2007; De Goede 2014, 101).  
Scholars exploring sensitive issues and information in the ‘digital age’ are affected by 
censorship in several ways. Most obviously, they need to be aware that information ‘freely’ 
accessible online is often filtered and, thus, censored. This raises questions about where to 
find and how to gain access to digitised information that is not freely available or kept from 
the public. In turn, researchers must think carefully about how to protect digitised data from 
third party access. They must be aware that research involving ICTs when examining 
politically sensitive topics can lead to digital surveillance and information control. 
Restrictions interfering with the higher education sector have, in the course of the last 
decade, been primarily implemented through regulatory means. For instance, both the United 
States (US) Patriot Act and the United Kingdom (UK) Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015 have been shown to impede on academic staff as well as students (Wilson 2005; 
Newman 2008, Hall 2015). In addition, less obvious manifestations of censorship are 
connected to the changing nature of academic funding (Hedgecoe 2015), the restriction to 
official documents (Barry and Bannister 2014), and constraints in scholarly communication 
systems (Moran and Mallory 1991; Nye and Barco 2012). Indeed, in 2015, the International 
Studies Association (ISA) was suspected of refusing to publish papers that drew on 
diplomatic cables released on the whistle-blower platform WikiLeaks (Michael 2015; see 
also O’Loughlin, this issue). Although the ISA (2015) issued a statement rejecting these 
practices, the allegation adds to the importance for international relations – and particularly 
security studies – to engage with problems surrounding information control. 
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Whilst scholars such as Heisler (2007, 351) acknowledge such ‘conventional’ threats 
to academic freedom, a lot of publications still fail to link the phenomenon with the growing 
process of digitalisation. They ignore that censorship and academic freedom are not only 
“shaped by the times” (Mittelman 2007, 364) but also by technological developments. The 
higher education sector is increasingly using, but also reliant upon, the Internet and 
associated ICTs. Technologically supported censorship and surveillance practices 
subsequently challenge the academic profession. These practices and their secrecy oblige 
researchers to reconsider the possible role censorship and surveillance may have on their 
work as well as on their research subjects.  
Most notably, digital information not only allows easier content duplication and 
distribution, but also easier restriction and access to it. This can occur in an unwanted 
manner, and with the interference potentially being caused by commercial and governmental 
actors, criminals or mere curious lurkers. It indicates why academia has to think more 
thoroughly about the potential implementation of circumvention methods. Researchers are 
facing novel ethical, security, and privacy challenges that affect both themselves and their 
participants. Security scholars are therefore advised to reflect upon potential risks through 
and in cyberspace (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010, 17). It is of the utmost importance to 
question ‘techno-fallacies’ (Marx 2007), as beliefs in alleged technological neutrality make 
academics inattentive to ICTs potential negative side-effects.  
In particular, ‘traditional’ research processes involving the collection, analysis, 
storage, presentation, and reuse of data need to be re-assessed. While digital data and online 
communication are essential for the daily practice of research, they can also put participants 
and their kin in danger. Information – and especially digital information – needs to be 
responsibly collected, managed, and stored. Some fields have initiatives to increase 
transparency and replication via developments such as the Data Access and Research 
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Transparency (DA-RT 2016) initiative. A key aspect of DA-RT involves cited data being 
published in a trusted data repository. It requires authors to make the empirical foundation of 
their research as accessible as possible. Given the sensitive and secretive nature of the topics 
and subjects security scholars investigate, at times, striking the right balance between 
openness and transparency on the one hand and the rights to privacy and security on the 
other, poses a significant challenge. For instance, the high-profile Boston College tape 
lawsuit vividly displayed how confidentiality agreements with participants were legally 
leveraged. In this instance, participants’ confidentiality was suspended due to a legal bid to 
gain access to interviews with former paramilitary members (Sampson 2015). The lawsuit 
exhibits this openness versus privacy dilemma, but also underlines how the collection of 
information leaves traces that can result in unanticipated consequences for participants and an 
entire research team.  
The balance between data transparency and the responsibility to protect sources is 
further complicated through the move towards digital technologies. While technological 
developments have made data protection technically possible, they have also created legal 
problems. This was illustrated in the case of former UK PhD student Bradley Garrett whose 
research data was confiscated and used in court against his subjects (Garrett 2014). Garrett’s 
work focused on the topic of ‘place hacking’ and involved the observation of groups that 
visited off-limits spaces, putting his participants and ultimately his whole research project on 
the edge of the law. As a result of the adverse outcomes for both himself and his participants, 
Garrett (2014) emphasised that the academic community had to stand up against such actions 
by the authorities and needed to consider data collection and protection procedures more 
carefully.  
These examples raise important questions about the legal status of scholars, the 
safeguarding of academics and participants, and, more profoundly, technological data safety 
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and integrity. At this moment in time, many universities and curricula still seem oblivious to 
these questions. While there are plenty of publications on ethics and methods in the digital 
age (Ackland 2013; Mutlu 2015) as well as ethics and methods trainings and assessments, the 
digital security and protection of researchers and subjects is barely addressed. In this regard 
security studies have failed to properly understand the implications of digitalisation for their 
own research practice. A fundamental discussion about digital information control and the 
implementation of potential resistance techniques is therefore overdue. Researchers need a 
good understanding of how online surveillance and digital censorship operates and how to 
circumvent and protect one’s work from these practices. The next two sections will shed 
some light on these areas. 
THE HOW 
Having outlined some of the reasons why security scholars are required to engage 
with digital information control, this paper will now examine how censorship is technically 
implementable and how these techniques can obstruct the academic profession. Eriksson and 
Giacomello (2009, 206) have already accentuated the importance of studying Internet 
controls. Technology allows for different manifestations of censorship and surveillance 
practices, ranging from severely intrusive and restrictive to more subtle and unapparent 
forms. In this regard, academics may never be aware of clear infringements on or 
interferences with their work. Nevertheless, even if such techniques are ‘invisible’ and/or 
based solely on the collection of electronic information, they can pose problems for scholars. 
One substantial and invasive censorship method is Internet content filtering and 
blocking. It is often facilitated through the application of firewalls at the national and/or 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) level (Liang and Lu 2010; Wagner 2014, 61). It is the 
equivalent to the process of borrowing a book from a library where a librarian initially reads 
and assesses the content for suitability before the publication is either passed on to the 
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recipient or destroyed. While techniques vary, content restrictions are common practices 
across states and frequently supported by commercial and non-commercial institutions. The 
most renowned instance is the ‘Great Firewall of China’ (Deibert 2002). However, the 
control of online information is becoming increasingly widespread, meaning that these 
measures are not restricted merely to oppressive regimes such as those in North Korea or 
Saudi Arabia. Increasingly liberal states engage in such illiberal practices (Reporters without 
Borders 2014, 3).  
The UK, for instance, filters web access by default through ISPs. Although users have 
the ability to opt out from content blocking, there have been numerous reports of ‘legitimate’ 
websites being censored. The restrictions included content related to sexual education and 
domestic abuse (Smith 2013), as well as politicians’ websites (Burrell 2013). More examples 
of governmental content blocking can be found in countries such as India or Russia (Kashmir 
Media Service 2014; Roth and Herszenhorn 2014). Projects such as the OpenNet Initiative 
(Deibert et al. 2008; 2010; 2011; ONI 2016) have documented many such examples. They 
demonstrate how the growing implementation of online blocking can hinder a comprehensive 
assessment of information, which is particularly important for security scholars in times of, 
for instance, elections or uprisings (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010, 27). 
A more apparent effect of content filtering on the daily practice of researchers is seen 
at the university and library level, representing a challenge to the professorial freedom of 
research and expression. A recent study by the British ‘Managing Access to the Internet in 
Public Libraries’ project indicates that filtering software is ubiquitous in libraries (Muir et al. 
2016). Two-thirds of the surveyed UK libraries had received complaints about the over-
blocking of websites, including the inability to access virtual learning environments and 
difficulty with rapidly unblocking content as a result of the filtering software. These findings 
echo those of previous studies, which found that such technologies have the potential to 
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inadvertently restrict access to legitimate educational sources (Peace 2003; Jaeger et al. 
2006).  
In addition to these blunt censorship methods, mass data collection and data analytics 
by institutional, commercial, and governmental actors pose risks to the academic community. 
A particular sub-field of data analytics is user profiling. This involves computer algorithms 
which discover patterns from personal data and proceed to identify correlations between these 
patterns and (groups of) individuals (Hasan et al. 2013). These algorithms construct profiles 
that foster “practices of exceptionalism” by including or excluding people and groups based 
on anticipated behaviour (Bigo 2006, 47). The accuracy of these profiles is fundamentally 
influenced by the data the algorithm receives, leading to potential misrepresentations.  
Profiling technologies are already commonly used within the higher education sector. 
They are typically employed to monitor students’ behaviour and performance (Warrell 2015; 
Harvard Magazine 2014). However, variations of these technologies may also put academics 
under closer watch. Specifically, security scholars who frequently investigate sensitive and 
controversial topics such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘torture’ can be earmarked for closer scrutiny. In 
fact, only recently Professor Richard Jackson, Editor-In-Chief of the journal Critical 
Terrorism Studies posted on Twitter that he was questioned by the New Zealand police 
(Jackson 2016). He thereafter speculated whether his research and in particular one of his 
blog posts in which he proposed to be a ‘terrorist sympathiser’ led to this (Jackson 2015). In 
this regard, online monitoring and corresponding data analytics add to the history of 
academics being prime targets for intelligence and security service surveillance (White 2008). 
Indeed, the mere knowledge that every website visited, web search performed, and 
message sent may be collected, stored, and analysed can restrict online behaviour. In the 
digital age, ‘big data’ becomes an “‘abstract authority’ of knowledge” (Aradau 2015, 28). 
Multiple publications highlight how online surveillance leads to ‘chilling effects’, 
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discouraging users from writing, uploading, and posting material (Dawson 2006; Townend 
2014; see also Pelopidas, this issue). Two recent studies on the effects of the Snowden 
revelations show how perceptions of surveillance contributed to an online spiral of silence 
(Stoycheff 2016) and a significant drop in the amount of web traffic to ‘privacy sensitive’ 
Wikipedia articles (Penney 2016). The immediate and long-term effects offer compelling 
evidence for the chilling effect associated with online surveillance. The impact of online self-
censorship has also been ascertained by the PEN American Center (2013). They identified 
that 1 in 6 writers and editors admitted avoiding writing on a topic they believed would 
subject them to online surveillance. This raises questions about the amount of research not 
being conducted due to anticipated adverse ramifications. 
Yet, technologically supported censorship is not only limited to the communication 
and dissemination of information and knowledge. It may also take the form of confiscation of 
equipment and general problems around the storage and transport of digital material. A 
number of states, including the US, Canada, and the UK, permit customs authorities to search 
the laptops of those entering the country (Burrell 2015). Both reporters and academics have 
had their laptops or data seized at Heathrow Airport (Topping 2013; Garrett 2014). Without 
proper precautions, data can be (accidentally or purposefully) impounded or destroyed. This 
can affect researchers even when they believe that they are acting within the law of a given 
jurisdiction. For example, foreign researchers conducting meteorological examinations in 
China had their equipment seized (Cyranoski 2008, 871). Although their equipment was 
returned, many of their instruments were tampered with. Digital data in particular is prone to 
such interceptions. Techniques exist and continue to be researched that allow for the deletion 
of data beyond recovery (Wei et al. 2011). 
Most importantly though, the censorship and surveillance practices outlined above are 
amplified through the active endeavour to break and sabotage cryptographic techniques. The 
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subversion ranges from efforts to influence technical standard bodies to those that exploit 
software and hardware vulnerabilities (Perlroth et al. 2013). In particular, intelligence 
agencies have an interest in breaking the very encryption that is essential for scholars to 
ensure secure communication or data storage (Ball et al. 2013). They foster research into the 
ability to de-anonymise Internet activity, sometimes with help of academic institutions or 
commercial actors (Cox 2016; Kushner 2016). In contrast, a report by the United Nation's 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression (A/HRC/29/32) provided strong support for the 
defence of anonymity and encryption. Similarly McKune (2015) calls the attempt to disrupt 
these tools a violation of the “right to science”. She argues that encryption is an 
implementation of mathematics and therefore a scientific development with the ability to 
facilitate free expression and privacy. Yet, in the current securitised climate, cryptographic 
tools are constantly threatened. This not only creates a risk due to the inability to protect 
material from intrusion. In the worst case, it can have the effect of discouraging research 
involving confidential, high-risk (re-)sources, leading to the prohibition of knowledge 
production and limiting the comprehensive understanding of society overall.  
THE WHAT (TO DO) 
The final part of this paper delineates methods for circumventing some of the 
mentioned technological information controls. Although we acknowledge that these issues 
require substantial political and social changes, we strongly believe that scholars can make 
small to medium gains by fighting these censorship and surveillance practices with 
technology. Indeed, one of the few articles addressing security issues in the scholarly 
profession has been published in the Research Ethics Review. Aldridge, Medina, and Ralphs 
(2010) provide fourteen guidelines for securing digitally held data. The authors refer to the 
importance of strong passwords, the need for secure storage and deletion of data, and the 
applicability of encryption software for researchers’ computers and online communication. 
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Extending this previous work, we hope to galvanize the security studies profession around the 
need for a broader examination of cryptographic tools to circumvent technologically 
supported censorship and surveillance practices.  
Two essential principles when bypassing censoring filters and monitoring systems are 
(a) the routing of connections over less restrictive network paths and (b) the modification of 
data prior to transit in order to prevent eavesdropping and the identification of activities. 
However, this is not to say that full anonymity is guaranteed. Despite modified or rerouted 
connections – an adversary with the required budget or substantial skills could overcome 
these efforts (Dahal et al. 2015). The methods can, thus, only improve the odds of remaining 
anonymous.  
One way of anonymising online traffic is through tools such as The Onion Router 
(Tor). Although the Tor project provides a collection of software, the easiest approach is to 
employ the Tor browser bundle. It is similar to any other web browser, but it encrypts and 
routes data through intermediary machines (i.e., nodes) before reaching its intended 
destination. Routing data through these different nodes, Tor avoids sending traffic directly. 
To put it more simply: The encrypted traffic basically ‘jumps’ through the network before 
leaving the final exit node. Tor consequently cloaks the original source and intended 
destination, reducing the chance of someone successfully monitoring or censoring the 
connection. Despite Tor’s potential misuse for pernicious reasons and its ability to be 
identified and blocked, the browser increases the anonymity of users (Moore and Rid 2016). 
This makes Tor a common instrument used by law enforcement, journalists and activists 
(Lewman 2013). Similarly, Tor provides options for academics in suppressive places to 
obtain uncensored information, but it could also be useful for any scholar researching 
sensitive or restricted topics.  
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Another way of overcoming censoring or monitoring network controls is by using a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN). A VPN is a technology typically employed to send traffic in 
a secure manner over an insecure network. It is advantageous when using a public or 
untrusted Internet connection, for example, at airports. It prevents others who are also part of 
the network from intercepting and modifying network traffic, avoiding so-called man-in-the-
middle attacks (Desmedt 2011). Thus, it involves creating a secure tunnel between one’s 
device (i.e., laptop; Point A) and the VPN (Point B), using the untrusted Internet connection. 
Through this connection one can then securely access the actual service one wants to reach 
(Point C). Besides, VPNs are frequently utilised to connect employees to internal employer 
networks or in academic settings to access journal papers/services from geographically 
separated networks beyond the university (Wolinsky et al. 2010). Hence, in the course of 
such a process the traffic is routed in a manner as if the device was accessing the content 
directly from within a private network. 
VPNs also help to hide the data that is being transmitted. The process can be 
explained through the metaphor of having paper wrapped around a translucent tube (i.e., the 
Internet) that is, through the VPN, now hidden behind an opaque coating. Although the actual 
transfer process can – similar to the application of Tor – potentially be detected and blocked, 
it provides a helpful method when sending data securely via a machine that is, for example, 
outside of a conflict zone or if there is a requirement to bypass the ISP or even internal 
university or library restrictions. Unlike Tor, VPNs do not provide any form of 
anonymization, but employ both of the earlier mentioned principles: They route traffic over 
an unrestricted network through the VPN server, and encrypt traffic between the internet-
enabled device, for example a researcher’s laptop, and the VPN. 
There are other methods that facilitate secure storage and transmission of data. The 
encryption of data is a way to elude censorship or surveillance, ensuring data integrity and 
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preventing intellectual property from falling into the wrong hands. As universities are 
increasingly becoming a hub for the generation of new knowledge and innovation, the 
possible theft of intellectual property is a fundamental concern for scholars. The prospect of, 
for instance, economic espionage may convince those sceptical of purely ethical arguments to 
apply encryption techniques within the remits of higher education. The encryption of data on 
computers, cloud services and also removable media – such as USB drives – may be achieved 
through software such as Veracrypt or GnuPG (GPG). Both guarantee password-protected 
access to documents or folders.  
In addition to secure data storage, academics can benefit from the usage of encrypted 
communication methods. A recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Bărbulescu v. Romania) highlighted that employers are allowed to read messages of 
employees sent through institutional accounts (Rawlinson 2016). For security studies scholars 
and academics in general, the decision is of significant importance when planning to 
communicate with vulnerable research subjects through online means. Moreover, it mirrors 
revelations about similar practices in the US, such as the secret monitoring of Harvard 
University’s deans’ email accounts to search for potential media leaks (Carmichael 2013). 
These cases reveal that secure and unmonitored communication is not fully guaranteed. 
Nonetheless, GPG can be availed of to encrypt email content, provided that sender and 
receiver have correctly configured GPG on their machines.  
A further method to communicate without fear of interception and/or modification is 
through a protocol called Off The Record (OTR). OTR is commonly used over instant 
messaging protocols and can be applied when using social media sites such as Facebook 
(Bian et al. 2007). Furthermore, encrypted instant messaging services such as Signal, as well 
as multiplatform voice and video conferencing applications such as Jitsi are also beneficial 
when organising or conducting interviews with vulnerable research subjects.  
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There are, of course, far more tools available that academics can implement into their 
daily practice. They range from password managers that allow for large character and number 
combinations to be securely stored, to alternative operating systems such as Tails. Tails is a 
live operating system which is booted via a DVD, USB stick, or SD card rather than the 
internal, more permanent, hard disk storage of the device. By default Tails leaves no trace on 
the actual computer/laptop. It is, thus, a convenient application for researchers when 
travelling, allowing not only for secure retention of research records but also their consequent 
destruction. Tails and the other techniques outlined here are some of the many free software 
projects used by journalists working on sensitive issues (Greenberg 2014). Yet, based on all 
the discussed technologically supported censorship and surveillance methods, they would 
certainly also be valuable for the academic and in particular the security scholar profession. 
Akin to Zevenbergen’s (2016) guidelines that inform research’s ethical assessment 
and encourage stakeholders to minimise risks before the data collection takes place, we hope 
to stimulate reflexivity. A culture of security sensitivity and greater awareness of 
technological pitfalls will provide the best way forward. We acknowledge that not all 
researchers are equally affected by the discussed censorship techniques and that they may 
affect researchers working in diverse socio-political and socio-technical contexts in different 
ways. Thus, not all will need the tools we outline here. However, they may be recommended 
when working on certain topics or with particular participants; they may be helpful during 
fieldwork in specific countries or conflict zones; and they may be valuable when handling 
any form of sensitive data that may compromise the privacy, integrity and/or life of 
participants and researchers. Ultimately, we encourage security studies scholars to 
fundamentally scrutinise their use of the Internet and ICTs and take up methods that would be 
auxiliary in their research.  
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These discussed cryptographic tools should complement general computer security 
recommendations1 and can be used, for example, to improve anonymity in the course of the 
research and data collection process. Academics should be cautious with their application. 
The information is published in good faith and for informational purposes. We stress the 
necessity of following regulatory requirements set out by institutions, ethics committees or 
other bodies. Taking these extra measures can help protect scholars and their data, but also 
put them at additional risk.  
We therefore emphasise, first, that the usage of these techniques can be restricted, 
resulting in breaches of contracts and/or legislation. Encryption and circumvention tools can 
be, if not outlawed, flagged as evidence of suspicious activity (Cheredar 2014). Second, we 
acknowledge that such technical recommendations are putting the burden on scholars to 
secure themselves. They are not challenging practices of censorship and surveillance as such. 
The instruments require some foundation of technological knowledge, and sometimes 
expenses that scholars may not have. Improperly safeguarding oneself can give a false sense 
of security and may put researchers and their subjects in danger. It is therefore recommended 
that scholars seek, if necessary, advice from technologists.  
It is also important to emphasise that none of the here-outlined techniques, nor any of 
the named products, can be ‘recommended’ as such. A crucial message to take away is that 
researchers often cannot solely rely on any of the outlined steps alone. As technology 
changes rapidly, instruments, practices and procedures have to adapt. Thus, we encourage 
researchers to keep up-to-date with the changing landscape of anti-surveillance and anti-
censorship tools. We point to discussions taking place in fields such as digital sociology and 
                                                          
1 Such as regular software updates, well-wrought backup schemes, usage of anti-virus, strong passwords, secure 
Internet connection (HTTPS), and the active monitoring of security alerts. 
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surveillance studies (Martin et al. 2009; Lyon 2013; 2014) and direct academics to the work 
of non-profit digital rights groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation as well as the 
worldwide Cryptoparty movement.  
CONCLUSION  
This contribution examined the ‘why’, ‘how’ and the ‘what to do’ in relation to 
technologically supported censorship and surveillance practices. Its basic message is for 
academics to pay more attention to these aspects and think more carefully about the 
consequences of digitalisation for the field. The ‘digital revolution’ has had profound effects 
on the right to privacy; the ability to seek, receive, and impart information; and the core 
principles of academic freedom. We consequently encourage scholars to include 
cryptographic tools among the methods they consider for research and communication. These 
can equip researchers with a suitable toolkit for bypassing technologically supported 
censorship and surveillance practices and help improve the anonymity and confidentiality of 
research processes. However, as these methods also pose risks, we encourage security 
scholars to be mindful when using these mechanisms and seek both legal and technical 
assistance.  
Aside from outlining these technical circumvention methods, we also hope to 
encourage a culture of critical reflection about digital practices. This reflection requires closer 
examination of the complicated links between secrecy, surveillance and censorship, and the 
balance between openness and transparency as well as the rights to security and privacy in 
the digital age. Any questioning of censorship and surveillance techniques also demands the 
instillation of security sensitivity and awareness. Security speaks to behaviour far more than 
it does to technology. Challenging online censorship and surveillance is, thus, not simply a 
matter of setting up devices and downloading software. It requires critical evaluation of what 
it means to send sensitive messages, to click on attachments or to store data online. 
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Addressing these behavioural limitations is far more profound and needs to go hand-in-hand 
with the here-proposed technological measures. 
Lastly, we hope to initiate a debate about the legal status and technical support of 
academics, aligning with recent calls for more safeguarding of universities personnel 
(Academics Anonymous 2016). Researchers and their participants should receive the same 
levels of protection as journalists and their sources. All of the here-mentioned aspects can 
impact on the daily practice of academics, the training of students and staff, and the 
composition of ethics committees. The latter would profit from ethical, legal and technical 
advice. We therefore encourage institutional review boards to develop an understanding of 
these issues so that they can sufficiently evaluate the security protocols academics propose.  
In conclusion, this publication hopes to have provided both answers but ultimately 
also raised questions for the higher education sector. The use of the Internet and the reliance 
on ICTs is both a gain but also a crux. The measures outlined above are not a panacea. They 
are probably more of a temporary relief than a remedy and do not address the root causes of 
technologically supported censorship and surveillance. It is therefore critical that academics 
across all disciplines raise the question of how universities can defend academic freedom. 
Security scholars in particular are exhorted to drive these discussions to ensure the best 
possible protection for both ourselves as well as our research subjects, allowing for 
independent, critical research in the digital age to proceed.  
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